Labor regulation and unemployment : the case of Tunisia by Ahmed, Salah & Aljane, Ali
International Journal in Economics and Business Administration 
Volume II, Issue 4, 2014  
pp. 3 - 13 
 
 
 
Labor Regulation and Unemployment: The Case of Tunisia 
 
Salah Ahmed
1
, Ali Aljane
2
  
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Using a different database of labor regulation, we sketch the relationship between labor 
market flexibility and unemployment in Tunisia during the period 2000-2013. The results of 
the study find no link between labor regulation and unemployment. The main finding from 
the dynamic panel estimation is that the labor regulation composite indicator used does not 
have a statistically significant association with the unemployment rate for the selected 115 
developing countries. However, there is a direct link between the firing and hiring regulation 
and unemployment. In addition, the interactive variable between these indicators and the 
dummy variable for Tunisia doesn’t seem to explain why unemployment is higher in Tunisia 
than in other countries. Regulation has no adverse effect on aggregate unemployment.  
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Introduction 
 
Unemployment rate in Tunisia is among the highest in the world and is largely an 
issue of youth. Tunisia’s unemployment rate is currently between 15% and 18% and 
it is above MENA’s average unemployment rate by about 3% to 4% in 2000-2010 
and 8% in 2011.  
 
Though, Tunisia’s annual growth rate of GDP was relatively high during the two last 
decades (4% to 5%), it did little to drop the unemployment rate which remained at 
its high levels. 
 
Moreover, the recent social and political events in Tunisia have contributed to the 
decline of economic activity and to the increase of unemployment. For instance, in 
the early 2011, unemployment has increased by about 7%.  
 
While some changes in the unemployment rate have been related to the business 
cycle, structural unemployment remains a major component. The latter is related to 
the labor market institutions. 
 
In the literature, the relationship between labor market institutions and 
unemployment remains widely debated and there is no consensus among economists 
on the impact of institutions on labor market outcomes. 
 
The orthodox view as represented by the OECD (1994) has been challenged by 
recent research (Bassanini and Duval 2006; Baker et al. 2005…). Indeed, much of 
the literature agrees that Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) has an adverse 
effect on unemployment. 
 
Botero et al. (2004), Djankov Simeon and Rita Ramalho (2009) find that the more 
rigid the employment laws are, the high are the rates of unemployment, especially 
for the young people. 
 
In a cross-national study of labor market regulations in 73 developed and developing 
countries, Feldman (2009) highlights the fact that strict labor market regulations 
increases unemployment all over the world. Likewise, Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012) 
argue that increased labor market flexibility can have an important effect in reducing 
unemployment. 
 
It is worthy to note that most of the previous studies are conducted for developed 
countries and a very little attention has been given to the developing countries. 
Therefore, this study is an attempt to fill this gap in the context of Tunisia. Our aim 
is to examine the effects of the EPL on aggregate and youth unemployment in the 
developing countries and more particularly in Tunisia. 
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The paper is organized as follow: in section 2 we present the characteristics of the 
labor market regulation in Tunisia in a comparative perspective. Section 3 describes 
the methodology used to test the effects of the labor law regulation on 
unemployment, following that we provide the different results. Finally, and in a 
fourth section, we discuss the main findings and conclude. 
 
1. The labor market regulation in Tunisia 
 
In Tunisia, the regulation of the labor market includes many measures intended to 
protect the employment sector. The intervention of the State in the labor market is 
traditionally important. In the wage bargaining, the tripartite mechanism
3
 has played 
an important role in the organization of the labor market, particularly in promoting 
measures for the reintegration of the manpower, fixing of salaries and to limit the 
shocks caused by the macroeconomic changes. 
 
Revision of the Labor Code (adopted in 1966) conducted in 1994 and 1996 aims the 
relaxation of the rules of work at the levels of the hiring and at the dismissal. The 
Labor Code has allowed a degree of flexibility by the introduction of the fixed-term 
contracts.  
 
Dismissals for economic reasons are not allowed, while procedural inconveniences 
for employers to dismiss redundant workers are extremely costly. 
 
Only one out of seven cases of dismissals ends up being accepted, and employers 
perceive that dismissal processes have a de facto bias toward workers. As a result, 
annual layoffs are less than 1 percent of the workforce compared to more than 10 
percent in the average OECD country.  
 
According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, hiring and firing 
regulations in Tunisia are more restrictive than those in the average emerging and 
developing country.  
 
Similarly, data from enterprise surveys indicates that, worldwide, the percentage of 
firms identifying labor regulation as a major constraint to their business operations 
is, on average, greatest in Tunisia.  
 
In addition, indicators of labor market flexibility show that such rigidities are 
particularly high and could significantly limit employment creation, particularly for 
first-time job seekers, by discouraging firms from expanding employment in 
response to favorable changes in the economic climate. 
 
In this study, we retain database from The Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of 
the World, which provides a composite measure of labor market flexibility.  
                                                          
3
Mechanism that involves the Government, the workers and the employers unions. 
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From 2001, the Institute Fraser on Economic Freedom in the World (EFW) gives six 
sub-indicators of labor institutions as a part of its indicator of economic freedom 
market. The composite indicator is standardized on a 0-10 range, with higher value 
of the indicator representing a more flexible labor market. This measure gives a 
lower rating to countries in which the free hiring and firing of workers is impeded by 
regulation. 
 
These sub-indicators are: 
i) Hiring regulations and minimum wage 
ii)  Hiring and Firing regulations 
iii)  Centralized collective bargaining assigns ratings based on the 
centralization of the wage bargaining process, which are higher for countries 
with a more decentralized bargaining process; 
iv)  The index of mandated cost of worker dismissal rates countries 
based on the cost of the requirements for advance notice, severance 
payments, and penalties due when dismissing a redundant worker; 
v)  The index of conscription rates countries based on the use and 
duration of military conscription, with the highest rating given to countries 
without military conscription. 
The use of indices developed from subjective data raises many reserves (Berg Janine 
and Sandrine Cazes, 2007). This indicator contains several conceptual problems, 
including the simplistic idea according to which "the regulation is a cost", which 
ignores the positive externalities associated with the right of the work and who is 
really the reason to be. It ignores many of the rights listed in the standards of the 
ILO and the international labor Conventions and has a tendency to discourage 
countries to meet a large number of international labor conventions of the ILO. 
 
In focusing on the external numerical flexibility, it neglects other important means of 
adjustment of the labor market, such as the flexibility of wages or that of the 
functions.  
 
This indicator points out that Tunisia labor market is overall not so rigid in absolute 
terms (scoring 6 out of 10), but less flexible than in other emerging countries.  
 
In addition, it seems that some sub- indices of labor market regulation are less than 
in other emerging countries. These are the cases of the hiring regulations and 
minimum wage, the hiring and firing regulations and the centralized collective 
bargaining. 
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Graph 1. Indicators of deregulation in the Arab countries in 2010 
 
 
Source: Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) database 
 
Graph 2. Indicators of in deregulation in 2010 
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2. Methodology and Results  
 
In order to test the impact of the regulation of the labor market on the evolution of 
unemployment, we have retained a modified version of the model of Blanchard and 
wolfers (2000):  
 In a static framework, the model can be written as follow: 
                                     (1) 
  is the unemployment rate at time t in country i 
 is a specific effect to each country; it represents country dummies that 
capture unobserved country-specific determinants of unemployment. 
L is a vector of institutional indicators of the labor market. 
D a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 for Tunisia and zero 
otherwise. 
X j is a set of macro-economic variables (growth of productivity, the real 
interest rate, and inflation); 
ε i, t is an error term. 
The subscripts i and t represent the particular country and the year, the 
superscript j stands for the particular independent variable 
 In a dynamic framework, the model is as follow:  
                         (2) 
Several econometric problems may arise from estimating the above equation. 
 
The endogeneity which is due to the presence of the lagged level of unemployment 
among the regressors and to reverse causality from changes in unemployment to 
labor market flexibility, 
 
The presence of the lagged dependent variable  gives rise to autocorrelation. 
 
Time-invariant country characteristics (fixed effects), such as geography and 
demographics, may be correlated with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects 
are contained in the error term in equation (2), which consists of the unobserved 
country-specific effects, vi, and the observation-specific errors, eit 
 
The coefficients on the lagged levels of independent variables provide an estimate of 
the long-term (permanent) effect of change in these variables on unemployment.  
                          (3) 
 
While Δ is the first-difference estimator, the lagged dependent variable is included 
among the predictors to capture the persistence of unemployment and hysteresis 
effects (Nickell et al. 2005). 
 
Changes in the unemployment rate also can cause policy makers to change 
employment protection legislations to address the adverse developments in the labor 
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market, and therefore, unemployment rate. In such cases, the direction of causality 
from the unemployment rate to employment protection legislations creates an 
endogeneity problem in regression estimations. Equation 3 is estimated using the 
two-step GMM-system estimator. 
 
All explanatory variables are considered as endogenous (instrumented using up to 2 
lags). The significance of the results is robust to different choices of instruments and 
predetermined variables. 
 
The objective of the estimate is to test why Tunisia has a higher unemployment rate 
than the average of other comparable countries, such as those of the Arab region and 
the countries in transition.  
 
Suppose that the model is validated for the sample considered, we are trying to 
explain the differential of the unemployment rate in Tunisia compared to the other 
countries by differences in the determinants as well as by the initial unemployment 
rate. 
 
The macroeconomic controls include GDP growth, the change in inflation (CPI), the 
terms of trade and the real interest rate. GDP growth and the change in inflation 
capture the influence of economic cycles. A fall in output is expected to be 
associated with higher unemployment. Following the logic of the Phillips curve, the 
change in inflation should be negatively related to unemployment in the short run. 
The terms of trade should have a negative relationship with unemployment. A 
deterioration of the terms of trade requires a downward adjustment of real wages. If 
wages do not respond accordingly, unemployment will likely to increase. Finally, 
the real interest rate affects capital accumulation and can cause shifts in labor 
demand. This variable should increase unemployment because an increase in real 
interest rates is likely to reduce aggregate demand (Baker et al. 2005). Models of 
youth unemployment also include the ratio of youth to adult (25–54 years) 
population as an additional control. 
 
The sample consists of 115 developing countries and covers the period 2000-2013. 
 
Given the dynamic nature of these models, the potential concerns about the Nickell 
bias endogeneity problems may still be present if omitted variables influence 
simultaneously EPL and unemployment. The Nickell bias (1981) refers to situations 
in which the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable makes the fixed-effect 
estimator biased due to the correlation between the demeaned lagged dependent 
variable and the error term. 
 
Since this estimator is designed for small T panels, difference GMM models 
(Arellano and Bond 1991), where institutional variables dated t−2 and earlier are 
used as instruments. 
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Table 1. Unemployment and Labor Market Flexibility-Dynamic Regression (GMM) 
 
Dependant 
variable : 
D.unemp 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
Unemp(t-1) -0.203*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.243** 
(-3.16) 
-0.251*** 
(-3.90) 
-0.176** 
(-3.27) 
-0.192** 
(-3.07) 
Laboreg 0.0638 
(0.60) 
-0.00357 
(-0.02) 
   
imf_inflch -0.00544 
(-1.92) 
    
D* laboreg -0.721 
(-0.49) 
0.969 
(0.56) 
   
imf_gdpgr -
0.0944**
* 
(-4.52) 
-
0.0859**
* 
(-3.41) 
-
0.0917**
* 
(-3.33) 
-
0.0890**
* 
(-3.37) 
-
0.0944**
* 
(-3.40) 
Hiring and firing   -0.470* 
(-2.50) 
 -0.259 
(-1.60) 
D* hiringfiringreg   1.068 
(1.26) 
 0.564 
(0.75) 
centcolbargaining    -0.117 
(-0.52) 
 
D*centcolbargainin
g 
   0.241 
(0.22) 
 
Constant 1.764* 
(2.06) 
2.326 
(1.45) 
4.636*** 
(3.73) 
2.491 
(1.70) 
3.094** 
(2.85) 
Observations 1184 1184 1062 1062 1062 
Number of coutries 115 115 108 108 108 
Hansentest, p-value 0.471 0.432 0.336 0.516 0.418 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.679 0.653 0.628 0.608 0.630 
Instrum. No 52 39 39 51 51 
Note : t –statistics in parenthesis * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 1 presents the results after using the model GMM system. The results obtained 
suggest that the effect of the flexibility of the labor market is not statistically 
significant with the exception of the flexibility of the Hiring and firing regulation. 
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The coefficients associated with the interactive variables constructed for Tunisia and 
indicating the flexibility of its labor market are not statistically significant, which 
suggests that the improvement in labor market flexibility does not affect the 
unemployment rate, even over the medium term. 
 
Our results are in conformity with of the recent studies of Avdagic and Salardi 
(2013) and Deakin and Prabirjit (2015). 
 
3. Conclusions  
The analysis of the results of the estimations highlights the following conclusions: 
 
In spite of the flexibility of the labor market by the introduction of temporary work 
contracts, the unemployment remains high in Tunisia. 
 
The effects of labor market institutions are more complex than do the neoliberal 
approach according to which the stringent labor protection increases unemployment.  
 
The complexity of the relationship between regulation and employment stems from 
the fact that the labor institutions are part of social standards which are specific to 
each country. 
 
The structural reforms aiming to increase the productivity are essential to reduce in a 
sustainable manner the unemployment rate. The improvement of the business 
climate would allow private firms to increase their productivity and thus strengthen 
their ability to create jobs. It should also alleviate the tax pressure on the activities 
that are labor-intensive. 
 
On the one hand, employers claim more labor market flexibility.  On the other hand, 
strong pressures are exerted by trade unions in order to claim the protection of 
employees, particularly the vulnerable groups - in order to preserve social cohesion 
and stability. A fair balance between efficiency and equity is necessary in order to 
provide a new social contract. 
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5. Annexes 
 
->Tunisia 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
imf_ue |               13    14.39923     1.94794     12.397        18.3 
wdi_une~yilo |    13    29.43077     1.79415      27               32.4 
wdi_unempilo |   13    13.59231     1.17647      12.4            15.7 
imf_gdpgr |          13     3.87684     2.18710       -1.937         6.2 
   -------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
hiringregm~e |     12    7.394443    .6474232     6.1             8.33333 
hiringfiri~g |        13    5.071935    .5148315     4.10864    5.83333 
centcolbar~g |      13    4.978615    .8981367     3.15789    6.13534 
hoursreg |             12    9.241667    .6694073     8.7          10 
mandcostdi~l |     12    8.231956    .3673267     7.75518     8.79482 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
laboreg |               13    6.145941    .7557364     3.7698      6.80162 
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-> Other countries  
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean          Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
imf_ue |                 919     9.901319     6.29403         .658       38.4 
wdi_une~yilo |   1483    18.45745     12.20178         .7            65.9 
wdi_unempilo |  1483      9.213082     6.75300         .3            38.7 
imf_gdpgr |         1488     4.582652     4.28721    -17.699        34.5 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
hiringregm~e |    1386     6.197036    2.770038          0         10 
hiringfiri~g |        1261    4.753807    1.274146          0            8.80176 
centcolbar~g |     1262     6.714013    1.241837          2            8.87681 
hoursreg |            1352     7.677518    1.849714          3.3     10 
mandcostdi~l |    1263     5.614777    3.108114          0         10 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
laboreg |               1401   6.162641     1.409498          2.28      9.725 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
